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All Look the Same? Diversity of labour market outcomes of Chinese ethnic 
group populations in the UK 
Tze Ming Mok and Lucinda Platt 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Abstract: With high average levels of qualifications and pay, ethnic Chinese minorities in 
the UK are often regarded as a migrant ‘success story’. At the same time, the limited 
evidence we have suggests that Chinese minorities may face ethnic penalties in the labour 
market, and that there is considerable heterogeneity within the aggregate Chinese ethnic 
category. In this paper, we address these issues of labour market outcomes and 
heterogeneity among UK Chinese using 38 pooled quarters of the UK Labour Force Survey. 
We show that for both wages and employment there are differences in labour market 
experience across five distinct Chinese origin groups compared to those similarly qualified 
in the white majority. Consistent ‘winners’ are Taiwan and Malaysian-born Chinese, while 
Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong-born experience substantial wage penalties. UK-born 
Chinese face wage penalties when working in traditional industries, in which they continue 
to cluster, and unemployment penalties. An important contributory factor to labour 
market outcomes of the different groups appears to be the extent of their relationship with 
the ethnic economy. We relate our findings to theories of ethnic embeddedness and 
enclave economies, as well as to the varying contexts of reception faced by immigrants 
from different cohorts. 
Keywords: Chinese; ethnic penalties; employment; wages; UK; enclave economies 
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benefited from the detailed feedback of two anonymous referees.  
 
Introduction 
The socio-economic position and labour market outcomes of the ethnic minority 
populations of the UK have been subject to a wealth of analysis over recent decades. The 
introduction of an ethnic group question in the 1991 Census and subsequent incorporation 
of ethnic group information into mainstream government and social surveys has enabled 
an unprecedented understanding of the socio-economic position of the UK’s minority 
groups. Heath and McMahon’s (1997) introduction of the concept of ethnic penalties in 
their analysis of employment outcomes in the 1991 Census has been followed by analysis 
of penalties in pay (e.g. Longhi and Platt 2008), social mobility (e.g. Zuccotti 2016), and 
occupational outcomes (e.g. Cheung and Health 2007). Yet, in much of this literature the 
position of the Chinese has been excluded or under-developed. This is partly an issue of 
group size and density. The Chinese form one of the smallest of the measured ethnic group 
categories: with under 300,000 (0.3% of the population of England and Wales) in 1991, it 
grew to just under 400,000 (0.7% of the population) by 2011. This translates into small 
numbers in standard surveys. Additionally, the relatively geographically dispersed nature 
of the population reduces the possibilities for sampling in large numbers even for 
specialist surveys. The youth of the UK-born Chinese population means that many have yet 
to reach adulthood, limiting analysis in the rapidly developing ‘second generation’ 
literature (Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008). This issue of small sample sizes renders 
interrogation of within-group diversity challenging. The statement made by Cheng in 1996 
that ‘[t]here is little knowledge about the socio-economic profile of the British-born 
Chinese’ (p.179) remains largely true today. 
The relative neglect of the UK Chinese’s socio-economic position is arguably not 
simply a question of the analytic challenges associated with small numbers.  With high 
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average wages (Longhi and Platt 2008) and striking educational success (e.g. DfE 2016), 
the Chinese population of the UK has often been regarded as an ‘immigrant success story’ 
(Francis and Archer 2005), and hence ‘unproblematic’ from the perspective of policy and 
academic analysis. Unlike the extensive US literature, which has tried to explain the routes 
to success of American-Chinese (Coleman 1988; Zhou 1995; Lee & Zhou 2015) and 
highlighted the diversity of those with Chinese origins (e.g. Waldinger et al. 1992), in the 
UK, as in Europe more generally, greater attention has been paid to those groups seen to be 
lagging behind.   
 Yet this rosy picture of a ‘model minority’ that cannot fail to attain occupational 
integration across the generations via educational success (Cheng 1996) is a partial one. 
First, it implies common cultural practices across a ‘group’ with diverse histories and 
countries of origin. Second, it is already challenged by a small extant body of quantitative 
research that suggests substantial diversity – or even polarisation – in economic outcomes 
across the Chinese category (Platt 2011; Luk 2008), and ongoing ethnic penalties in the 
labour market (Cheung and Heath 2007; Rafferty 2012).   
 Such diversity of outcomes across the UK Chinese population accords with the 
different routes by which Chinese subpopulations arrived and the resources they brought 
with them; whether, for example, they arrived as labour migrants, through chain 
migration, as refugees or students, at times of economic buoyancy or of depression. It also 
speaks to the contexts in which they were inserted following migration, including the 
extent to which they were embedded in ethnic communities, the opportunities available to 
them, and the degree of discrimination they encountered.   
In this paper we ‘unpack’ the UK Chinese ethnic group and describe the socio-
economic position of five subpopulations who self-identify as Chinese, representing 
different countries of origin and migration trajectories. We highlight the dangers of 
ascribing average experience to those belonging to a constructed ethnic category, which is 
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then used to invoke cultural accounts (Jiménez et al 2015).  Instead, we draw on theories of 
ethnic embeddedness, ethnic resources, and contexts of reception to frame our 
understanding of different outcomes. Specifically, we utilise the literature on the positive 
aspects of ethnic embeddedness in terms of social, cultural (Coleman 1988; Portes and 
Zhou 1993) and ethnic (Borjas 1992) capital, as well as that highlighting the more 
negligible or negative consequences of ‘enclave economies’ (Clark and Drinkwater 2002; 
Xie and Gough 2011) to illuminate the economic risks and benefits associated with close 
reliance on ethnic economies. Our study offers a stimulus to reconsidering existing 
literature on Chinese ethnic embeddedness and suggests caution for those assuming 
cultural explanations based on administrative categories.  
 
Chinese migration to the UK: History, group heterogeneity and intra-ethnic 
dynamics 
Our analysis takes place against the backdrop of broad historical, political, cultural, 
linguistic and self-selective migrant cohort differences among the main Chinese groups in 
the UK.  These main groups, which together make up over 90 per cent of the self-identified 
Chinese in the UK, are the Hong Kong-born (around 18 per cent), the Mainland Chinese 
(around 35 per cent), the Taiwanese, Malaysians and Singaporeans (around 11 per cent), 
the Sino-Vietnamese (Vietnamese-born Chinese) (around 4 per cent), and the UK-born 
children of all of these communities (dominated by the children of Hong Kong migrants), 
who now form a quarter of the UK Chinese, though many are still children.   
In the UK, Chinese communities were traditionally dominated by Cantonese-
speaking pre-revolutionary or mid-century arrivals from southern China and from pre-
handover Hong Kong. A key characteristic of this early first generation community in the 
UK, has been its role in the establishment of enclave economies based around food and 
catering, in response to historical exclusion from the mainstream economy. 
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The UK’s Chinese Vietnamese-born population largely derives from the forced 
migration following the fall of Saigon and the associated refugee resettlement programme 
in the late 70s and early 80s. This was a migration primarily of Sino-Vietnamese. The Sino-
Vietnamese refugees were initially dispersed to reception centres across the UK, though 
they subsequently typically resettled in large conurbations with some degree of co-ethnic 
contact. These refugees predominantly spoke Cantonese (spoken by around 60 per cent of 
the Sino-Vietnamese overall), and had little English language fluency. They were not 
positively selected in terms of education or skills. Despite resettlement programmes, their 
outcomes have typically been marked by low income and high unemployment.  
 In the 1980s and 1990s, increased freedom of movement for citizens of the 
People’s Republic of China, and the rapid development of East and Southeast Asian 
economies, started a wave of migration that shifted the demographic and cultural balance 
of the Chinese diaspora. Migration from Taiwan, and Commonwealth Malaysia and 
Singapore, was associated with highly educated professionals from a range of linguistic 
backgrounds. The Taiwanese spoke Mandarin and Hokkien; while Chinese migrants from 
Commonwealth Malaysia and Singapore have particular flexibility and cultural capital as 
fluent English speakers, and most are conversant in, or at least understand, Mandarin, 
Hokkien and Cantonese, the main Chinese dialects used across the different Chinese 
subgroups  
By contrast, legal and illegal flows from China’s Fujian province throughout the 
1990s to the early 2000s have been presented, primarily in qualitative literature, as a new 
low-skilled, low-wage labour force of ‘last resort’ for the more established Hong 
Kong/Cantonese run ethnic economy (Biao and Pieke 2010).  While the Hong Kong 
reception community provided employment, wages were often exploitative; and language 
and cultural barriers between the Mandarin speaking employees and their Cantonese 
employers meant that employment was not accompanied by a substantive sense of a 
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coethnic community with social support and opportunities for social mobility (Pai 2008).   
This period of migration was followed by increasing restrictions on non-EU 
migration. Working visas for non-EU unskilled migration were eliminated in 2008 and all 
non-EU migration was capped from 2011. However, the rate of non-student migration 
from China has stayed stable and now selects for the highly-educated, while the numbers 
of Mainland Chinese students have increased dramatically.  As a result, seventy-nine per 
cent of the increase in the recorded Chinese population between the 2001 and 2011 
Censuses (from 0.4-0.7% of the population) is due to immigration from Mainland China 
(ONS 2013).  According to Home Office migration statistics, China has been the largest 
single source country for non-visitor, non-EU immigration to the UK since 2013 (Home 
Office 2018).   
Across these cohorts from different origin countries, language is clearly a major 
cleavage that disrupts potentially unifying Chinese identification. Intra-group linguistic 
barriers may inhibit communication and commonality, with no common spoken language 
for several of the largest Chinese subgroups other than English. Fluency in English itself 
varies, with the 2011 Census reporting that 30 per cent of those whose first language was 
Mandarin, 40 per cent of Cantonese speakers, and 25 per cent of speakers of other Chinese 
languages spoke English not well or not at all, though this disguises differences between 
origin countries. 
There are several other key intra-ethnic divisions worth noting.  Political animosity 
between supporters of Taiwanese or Hong Kong nationalism, and those loyal to the unitary 
Chinese state also splits the diaspora. Different class backgrounds in migration cohort 
profiles can also result in divisions in terms of social and geographical space and economic 
activity.  For example, in the USA we see the Taiwanese avoiding historically working-class 
Cantonese-dominated ethnic enclaves, employing strategies for economic integration that 
leverage their higher levels of capital and education (Waldinger et al. 1992).  
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Yet these intra-ethnic dynamics are all but invisible in the UK literature. And even 
as the cultural and demographic landscape of the Chinese in Britain has changed, the now 
dominant Mainland Chinese population, as well as the increasing Taiwanese and Malaysian 
Chinese populations, remain poorly understood. 
Contemporary literature on European migrant integration has a strong emphasis 
on second-generation outcomes. UK-born Chinese and Indians are noted for their high 
academic achievement (DfE 2016), albeit without much in the way of explanation (Heath, 
Rothon and Kilpi 2008). However, the British-born Chinese (BBCs) are today a smaller 
percentage of the UK Chinese population than they were at the time of the 1991 Census, 
having dropped from 28% to 23.4% by 2011 (ONS 2013; Cheng 1996), as the migrant 
generation continues to be refreshed by new arrivals. In this context, the future of 
subsequent BBCs cannot be straightforwardly ‘read off’ from the current second 
generation: the diversity of first generation Chinese migrant outcomes may speak to 
different sorts of future trajectories for BBCs.   
Where, despite data constraints, work has covered the UK Chinese it has  revealed 
internal economic diversity or even polarization (Platt 2011), and persisting ethnic 
penalties (Heath and Cheung 2007; Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008; Simpson et al. 2006), 
despite high average wages and qualifications, and accompanying positive stereotypes 
(Burgess and Greaves 2013). Noting the challenges in receiving adequate returns to 
qualifications, Rafferty (2012) highlighted specific ethnic penalties and increasing ‘over-
education’ for tertiary-educated British-born Chinese men. At the same time, an extensive 
qualitative literature has highlighted the insecurity and poor economic position of 
undocumented Mainland Chinese migrant workers (Biao and Pieke 2010; Pai 2008; 
Pharoah, Bell, Hui and Yeung 2009; Scott et al. 2012). Together these literatures draw 
attention to the limitations of our current understanding of the UK Chinese diaspora and 
possible differentiated experiences across migration cohorts.  
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Luk (2008) provides one study that aimed to illuminate the contemporary diversity 
of the British Chinese communities. Primarily a geographical spatial analysis based on 
2011 Census tables rather than microdata, Luk’s study nevertheless highlighted some key 
differences between groups, namely the low socio-economic status of the Vietnamese-born 
refugee generation, and the clustering of the Hong Kong-born population in catering and 
hospitality. However, Luk’s (2008) characterization of the Mainland Chinese inflows at that 
time as mostly low-skilled and poorly educated has been superseded by the changes in 
migration patterns; and the grouping of Taiwanese with Mainland Chinese prevented 
consideration of their potentially distinctive integration pathways.   
Even within existing data constraints, there are therefore good reasons for 
investigating the economic diversity of the UK Chinese population and its roots. Key 
literature attempting to account for the economic outcomes of Chinese in the US has 
centred on Chinese ethnic enclave economies (Zhou 1995; Zhou and Logan 1989; Lee and 
Zhou 2015). We turn next to the Chinese ethnic economy for potential insight into the 
Chinese minority’s differentiated economic outcomes in the UK. 
 
Ethnic embeddedness, ethnic enclaves and contexts of reception 
Despite much discussion of Chinese enclave economics, physical Chinese enclaves are not 
the typical residence of the majority of the UK’s Chinese population. The UK Chinese have 
the widest geographical dispersion of any of the ethnic minorities in the country, theorized 
by Luk (2009) as an outcome of their historical strategy of chasing the ‘white market’ 
beyond the enclave, to escape co-ethnic competition.  Thus, although similar in size to the 
Bangladeshi community, the Chinese lack that community’s geographical concentration, 
community solidarity, or political visibility.  Nevertheless, ethnic embeddedness – or its 
absence – remains relevant to the context of reception of different migration flows, and for 
its potential impact on future trajectories.  
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 There is a lively debate in the literature on the positive or negative impact of ethnic 
enclaves on workers. One perspective suggests that they provide an alternative to 
marginalization in the secondary labour market (Portes and Jensen 1987; Esser 2006), by 
allowing returns to skills not recognized in the host society. This operates through 
provision to an ethnically specific market, via entrepreneurialism or employment by co-
ethnic entrepreneurs. For new immigrants, the enclave can thus theoretically offer better 
economic returns, and reduce the information (not to mention language and cultural 
communication) costs associated with an unfamiliar labour market. Yet this positive 
construction of the ethnic enclave has been contested.  
Addressing the experience of new immigrants in the US, Xie and Gough (2011) 
failed to identify  the  positive economic benefits of enclaves  proposed in the literature. 
They situated their argument within the debate around the ways in which enclaves may 
(e.g. Portes and Jensen 1987), or may not (e.g. Sanders and Nee 1987) have positive 
implications for migrants’ employment and wage growth. Key to the latter argument is the 
division of interests between employers and employees in the enclave with employers 
having an interest in suppressing the wages of employees to remain competitive.  In the UK 
context, Clark and Drinkwater (2002) also found no support for the positive labour market 
effects linked to enclaves.  They found instead that occupational segregation was linked to 
labour market exclusion, while lacking the characteristics of ethnic embeddedness and 
entrepreneurialism associated with enclave economies.  
  Comparable to the literature on ethnic enclaves, studies of ‘segmented 
assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou 1993) of multigenerational migrant communities have 
emphasized the effect of the ethnic minority ‘reception community’ not only in the 
integration of new migrants when they arrive, but for the patterns of economic success of 
the second generation (e.g. Luthra, Soehl and Waldinger 2017; Waters et al. 2010).  The 
work of Zhou (1995; Zhou and Logan 1989; Portes and Zhou 1993; Lee and Zhou 2015) 
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has emphasised the role of the enclave community in facilitating educational success in 
Chinese communities in the US through forms of social capital, harking back to Coleman’s 
(1988) classic study of the role of social capital in the production of human capital. In 
similar vein, Borjas (1992) has highlighted the role of community ‘ethnic capital’ in 
facilitating the educational and economic success of co-ethnics without independent 
resources.  Yet, as the theory of segmented assimilation explicitly indicates, the positive or 
negative role of community, ethnic embeddedness or community density cannot be 
assumed, but will vary both with the nature of the receiving society response as well as 
with the class backgrounds, culture, language exposure, skills, or different source 
countries, even for the ‘same’ ethnic group (Esser 2006; Waldinger et al. 1992; Waters et 
al. 2010). 
Luk (2009) draws on and extends the literature on ethnic embeddedness in his 
model of the Chinese ethnic economy. For him, despite not being physically situated in an 
ethnic enclave, the UK Chinese are nonetheless defined by relationships to it – even if those 
relationships are based on rejecting rather than belonging to the enclave economy. Luk 
theorizes heterogeneous pathways to economic and social integration for a diverse 
Chinese population. The different groups are envisaged as slotting in various ways into a 
‘Chinese industrial system’: an urban ethnic economy of major industries expanding out 
from the enclave hub of London’s Chinatown.  
Even while describing the Chinese ‘success story’, Pang and Lau (1998) highlight 
the circumscribed nature of the occupations that Chinese work in, and the waste of human 
capital associated with the occupational ‘niche’ of the catering industry. They have pointed 
to a ‘bimodal’ trend in British Chinese labour market segregation, suggesting a split 
between the professional class and ethnic sector workers (cf. Scott et al. 2012).  As the 
Chinese population increases and diversifies, the dependence on this potentially 
inequitable ‘industrial system’ may reduce; but we currently have little understanding of 
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how far low-wage industries typical of the Chinese ethnic economy are implicated in ethnic 
penalties for different Chinese subgroups. 
This paper, therefore, investigates diversity and cleavages within the UK Chinese 
population; and it addresses the contribution of the (low wage) ‘enclave’ economy to the 
employment outcomes of those distinguished by country of origin and (by implication) 
cohort, language, and context of reception. To this end, it asks the following research 
questions:  
1. Do Chinese subgroups with distinct migration histories face different ethnic penalties 
(or premia) in earnings and unemployment?  
2.  To what extent can any differences in labour market outcomes of Chinese subgroups 
be explained by timing of arrival and representation in the ethnic economy? 
Given existing evidence suggests that the aggregate Chinese group suffer an ethnic 
penalty in employment after controlling for education, we expect to find ethnic penalties 
among the Chinese subgroups; but based on the preceding discussion we would expect 
them to differ in the following ways:  
a) We expect the Hong Kong-born, given that they are the group traditionally most closely 
associated with the low-wage ethnic enclave economy and its related ‘system’ of 
entrepreneurial self-employment, to experience substantial wage penalties linked to 
occupational clustering, though limited wage penalties within those occupations. Based on 
the potential trade-off between ethnic economies and employment, we expect them to 
have the lowest chances of unemployment. 
b) We expect the Mainland Chinese to have relatively high unemployment, once taking 
account of their educational level, as a result of the barriers to the labour market for skilled 
Mainland migrants documented in other countries, and less historical connection to the 
high-employment ethnic economy.  As the most recently arrived cohort, we expect that 
much of their disadvantage will be mediated by time of arrival, with more recent arrival 
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linked to more negative employment and wage outcomes across the board. We expect that 
wage levels for those in work outside the ethnic economy will be largely driven by their 
educational qualifications; while wages in the enclave economy will be low, even compared 
to the average wages in these occupations, given their documented susceptibility to 
enclave exploitation.  
c) We expect the Sino-Vietnamese to have low wages across both enclave and non-enclave 
employment, which will partly be explained by education, and partly due to their profile of 
forced migration rather than self-selective economic migration. We also expect them to 
face higher unemployment, for the same reasons. 
d) We expect the British-born Chinese, primarily the children of the Hong Kong-born 
migrants to have the smallest labour market penalties (given education) of all the 
subgroups when compared with the white British. This expectation stems from existing 
ethnic penalty research showing the relative advantage of the second generation compared 
with the foreign-born, and the role of the aspirations of economic migrants for their 
children (Lee and Zhou 2015; Francis and Archer 2005) 
We have no clear expectations about the labour market experience of Taiwanese, 
Malaysian, Singaporean and other smaller Chinese subgroups, as there is no existing UK 
literature to draw on for them.  
 
Data and methods 
Data and sample 
We pooled 38 waves of the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) from the first quarter 
of 2008 to the second quarter of 2017. The Labour Force Survey is a national survey 
focusing on labour market participation of UK resident adults living in private households. 
It is a quarterly study, with around 60,000 interviews carried out each quarter. The survey 
has a rotating semi-panel design with respondents interviewed for five consecutive 
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quarters.  Earnings information is only asked in the first and fifth wave.  We retain 
respondents from wave 1 only, giving a set of unique observations, with wage information 
for those in paid employment.  We restricted our sample to those aged 20-64 and excluded 
full-time students. Those who had migrated to the UK within the last six months are 
ineligible for the LFS, thus excluding the most transient populations.  
The LFS has the advantage of detailed country of birth and ethnic group 
information, as well as date of migration, and educational qualifications. A non-comparable 
ethnic group question was employed in Northern Ireland, so we restrict our sample to 
Great Britain. We are concerned with those who selected Chinese as their ethnic group. 
This provided us with 2,107 respondents who self-identified as ethnically Chinese. We 
necessarily exclude all those of ethnic Chinese origin but who chose not to identify as 
Chinese.1 Wage information is only available for those economically active and in paid 
employment. Taking into account in addition around 34 percent non-response on the 
earnings measure, we had a sample of 864 Chinese with wage information. Analysis of 
unemployment is based on the economically active population, who amount to 1,585. 
Hence, by pooling sufficient numbers of waves of data we were able to construct a 
sufficiently large sample to enable us to explore differences within the Chinese category.  
We constructed a comparison sample of 385, 928 identifying as white majority who were 
born in the UK, with 183,243 having wage information; and 288,560 economically active.  
The LFS is supplied with weights to adjust for non-response to the survey as a 
whole and for the additional non-response on earnings data, enabling us to provide robust 
                                                             
1 By definition, since we analyse those who choose to identify as Chinese, we do not know the extent of non-
Chinese identification by those of Chinese ancestry, or the implications for our findings. However, we do know 
that the Chinese category is the most stable and inter-generationally ‘sticky’ of the UK minority groups, and 
that ethnic attrition would mostly affect those who are of mixed Chinese and other ethnicity, who we assume 
are predominantly BBCs (blinded). Some evidence suggests that outcomes for Mixed people who select into 
mono-ethnic Asian ethnic groups may be midway between those who choose white British (who have lower 
status) and those who choose Mixed (higher status), meaning that our results for BBCs could be either biased 
upwards or downwards (blinded). 
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population level estimates. The appropriate weights were used in all analyses.  
 
Measures 
Dependent variables 
We analysed two key labour market outcomes: earnings and unemployment. For earnings 
we used the derived variable of hourly pay of those in paid work, deflated by the Consumer 
Price Index (Q1 2015=1); and log-transformed the measure. Self-employment income is 
challenging to estimate reliably so is not derived in the LFS. As a result, entrepreneurial 
income is necessarily excluded from our analysis. We discuss the implications of this 
exclusion in the text.  We measure unemployment using the derived variable that follows 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) definition. 
 
Explanatory variables 
We distinguished five Chinese subgroups, based on country of birth, for which we could 
construct samples large enough for analysis. The five groups are, in order of sample size: 
Mainland Chinese, born in China – hereafter Mainlanders (N=741; with wage information 
N=281); Hong Kong & Macau-born Chinese – hereafter Hong Kong Chinese (N=488; with 
wage information N=165); UK-born Chinese -  hereafter BBCs (N=379; with wage 
information N=183); Taiwanese, Malaysian, Singaporean Chinese – hereafter TMS  Chinese 
(N=389; with wage information N=180), and Sino-Vietnamese, Other South East Asian and 
Islander Chinese – hereafter Sino-Vietnamese and others (N=150; with wage information 
N=55).  
A small number of Macau-born Chinese were grouped with Hong Kong-born, given 
close colonial and postcolonial relationships and cultural and linguistic commonalities. 
Singaporean Chinese were grouped with Malaysians due to close colonial, postcolonial and 
cultural-linguistic relationships, and the tendency to form joint communities in the 
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diaspora. Due to sample size constraints, they were further combined with the Taiwanese 
due to broad commonalities of economic development, and very similar descriptive 
characteristics in all but age cohort and time of migration. These analyses on the combined 
group were checked for consistency with analyses on the individual groups.  
 We grouped Sino-Vietnamese with Other Southeast Asian Chinese and 
Island-born Chinese to provide an analytical sample of sufficient size. Those who were 
born in Vietnam but who did not identify as Chinese were, necessarily excluded from 
analysis. We assume that those excluded were primarily not Sino-Vietnamese. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that, according to the 2011 Census, those Vietnamese 
who identified as Chinese predominantly arrived in the pre-1981 period, in line with the 
refugee flow, while later arrivals from Vietnam overwhelmingly identified as ‘Other Asian’ 
rather than Chinese (ONS 2014).  ‘Other Southeast Asian’ Chinese were primarily Thai and 
Filipino Chinese who had migrated more recently, and had a younger and more educated 
profile.  Jamaican Chinese were grouped with Mauritian Chinese, due to both being multi-
ethnic small island states not in Asia, with small Chinese minorities, similar early 
postcolonial/post-WWII outmigration patterns to the UK and Europe, and correspondingly 
similar age profiles.  As with the TMS Chinese group, analysis of this combined group was 
checked for consistency against the patterns in the small individual groups and showed the 
same pattern.  
We excluded the small numbers of self-defined Chinese who did not fit in any of 
these country of birth categories.  
Our reference group against which to compare these Chinese groups was those 
identifying as white UK (British, English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish) who were born in 
the UK.  
 
Other measures 
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To estimate ethnic penalties, i.e. employment outcomes conditional on education, we 
included a dummy for tertiary educated. While a rather simple measure of educational 
qualifications this was the only consistent measure for those educated in different national 
contexts.  
To capture the impact of relatively recent migration, while still allowing for 
comparison across cohorts, we distinguished those who had arrived less than 10 years 
previously from those who migrated earlier (or were UK-born). For sensitivity, we checked, 
and confirmed, that the results were consistent using an alternative measure based on only 
five years since migration.  
Finally, to capture the Chinese ethnic enclave economy we drew on the LFS 
occupational group of ‘distribution, food and hospitality’, the SOC code which most closely 
maps on to the catering and related activities typical of the Chinese ‘niche’ economy. As 
part of our descriptive analysis we also measured rates of self-employment.  
 
Controls 
All analyses were adjusted for age in bands (20-29, 30-39 and 40+) and for sex.2 Broad 
banded age dummies took account of potential non-linearities in age and better enabled us 
to compare results across groups with different age distributions.  
 
Descriptive statistics by sub-group are provided in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
                                                             
2 We considered additional controls such as those for marital status and health status. But given the potential 
endogeneity of these with wages, we preferred our more parsimonious model. Results were unaffected by 
alternative specifications including such additional measures.  
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Analytical strategy 
To address question 1, we estimated a sequence of OLS models of log wages on the pooled 
sample. We first controlled only for age and sex, and then included education to ascertain 
the extent to which subgroups experienced ‘ethnic penalties’ relative to the majority 
population (cf. Heath and McMahon 1997), followed by recency of arrival to capture any 
effects linked to the timing of arrival.  
For question 2, we re-estimated the models adding our measure of the enclave 
economy (distribution, hospitality and catering), to identify the extent to which 
concentration in the enclave economy was linked to wage penalties, and then interacting 
the industry dummy with the Chinese subpopulations, to identify the extent to which there 
were wage penalties within the low-wage ethnic economy. 
The log transformation of earnings means that we can interpret coefficients in the 
OLS models as representing the proportional change in earnings associated with that 
characteristic. For ease of exposition we present graphical illustrations of our main 
findings. 
To identify unemployment penalties, and to ascertain if there appeared to be any 
trade-off between pay and unemployment, we estimated logistic regression models for the 
probability of unemployment. We present two models, the first controlling for age, sex, and 
education, and the second adding recency of arrival to clarify the extent to which 
differences in labour market access across groups was driven by being newer migrants. We 
report average marginal effects, which describe the percentage point difference in 
unemployment for the Chinese sub-groups compared to the White British majority.  
 Due to sample size constraints,  we estimate pooled models  for men and women. 
However, exploratory models estimated for each sex separately produced results 
consistent with the overall pattern presented here. Adding gender interactions to the 
models resulted in no statistically significant interactions. Descriptive data showed 
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similarly high employment rates and participation in the ‘distribution, hospitality and 
retail’ sector for both Chinese women and men. 
Our results on penalties are subject to the assumption that there is no differential 
onward or return migration across our groups. If there was, then those subgroups with 
more onward or return migration might appear to be doing worse if the most highly 
selected left. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) suggest that return migrants predominantly 
leave within the first five years after migration. As a sensitivity analysis, we therefore re-
estimated our models excluding all those who had arrived in the UK within the last five 
years to provide estimates for those who can be assumed to be long-term in the UK. 
Results were consistent with those presented here (see online supplementary material, 
Tables S1 and S2).  
  
Results 
Wages  
We first verified that very high rates of tertiary education amongst both Chinese migrants 
and the UK-born Chinese translated into significant wage penalties for the Chinese group 
as a whole, consistent with earlier research (e.g. Rafferty 2012). Our aim was to 
understand how far this pattern prevailed across the different subgroups. Table 2 shows 
the results from the wage equations, with just the basic controls (Model 1) then adding 
tertiary education (Model 2), and recency of arrival (Model 3).  
 Focusing first on Model 2, as expected, the Sino-Vietnamese and non-
Commonwealth Southeast Asian and Island-nation Chinese group suffered substantial 
wage penalties (18 per cent less than equivalent white majority workers), as did the Hong 
Kong-born penalty (14 per cent).  Mainlanders had a wage penalty of 11 per cent.  The 
BBC’s overall wage advantage was entirely driven by education, as shown by the small, and 
non-statistically significant, coefficient in Model 2. However, contrary to our hypotheses, it 
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was not the UK-born who were proving most successful in the labour market among the 
Chinese populations. Instead, TMS Chinese, the least researched of the main Chinese 
groups, were the ‘success story’ when it came to wages, with a substantial pay advantage 
that was only partly mediated by their educational qualifications.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
We anticipated that the more recent arrival of the Mainlanders would be 
implicated in their pay penalties. As illustrated in Model 3, having migrated within the last 
10 years was significantly associated with a 12 per cent lower wage, demonstrating how 
integration into higher wage employment is a temporal phenomenon. Once taking into 
account relative recency of arrival, Mainlanders no longer suffered a statistically significant 
wage penalty compared to the white majority, while TMS Chinese had a 12 per cent pay 
advantage over the white British (Model 3 and Figure 1). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 Past literature on Chinese labour market outcomes in the UK emphasises the 
prevalence of self-employment as an economic strategy to ‘escape’ the low-wage physical 
enclave.  Self-employment has been associated with an income advantage over being an 
employee for Chinese people – the opposite of the situation for other ethnic groups (Clark 
and Drinkwater 2002). As Table 1 illustrated, the distribution of self-employment/small 
business ownership among the Chinese subgroups varied widely. Only the Hong Kong-
born and to a much lesser extent Mainlanders had a markedly higher self-employment rate 
than the white majority, and for TMS Chinese self-employment rates were below the 
majority average.  The demographic (and institutional) changes that have led to these 
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varied patterns of self-employment are insufficiently recognised in existing theories, which 
have assumed high levels of Chinese self-employment overall as part of the narrative of 
Chinese migrant success.  
It is likely that our picture for the Hong Kong-born specifically is partial, since they 
have high rates of self-employment and the LFS does not enable us to factor the returns to 
self-employment into our wage estimates. Given the potential distinction to returns for 
employers compared to employees working in the ethnic economy (Sanders and Nee 
1987), we may have a more negative picture than if we were able to include self-
employment incomes.  We therefore carried out additional analysis using income 
information from the Citizenship Survey for England and Wales (2005-2011), where the 
income measure includes all income including that from self-employment or small 
business ownership.  This supplementary analysis (available on request) indicated income 
penalties for Mainlanders compared to the White British, after controlling for recency of 
arrival and tertiary qualifications, but suggested the Hong Kong born faced only a 
marginally significant income penalty, even if a lower point estimate. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that self-employment may provide some financial benefit for 
this group. While experiencing low wages in paid work, higher income from self-
employment may be lifting the Hong Kong Chinese’s relative position, although not 
necessarily enough – or among enough of them – to completely eliminate their 
disadvantage.  How far the ethnic economy is a source of the disadvantage across the 
population subgroups is the issue we turn to next.  
  
Occupational clustering  
We re-estimated the LFS log wage equation, including a control for the ‘distribution, 
restaurant and hospitality’ industries (Model 4 Table 2).  The inclusion of this variable 
significantly improved model fit, indicating that these industries are linked to pay in 
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general. Indeed, the industry dummy was associated with 24 per cent lower pay.  The 
reduced size of earnings penalties for Hong Kong and Sino-Vietnamese subgroups in Model 
4 indicates that their concentration in these low-paying industries was largely mediating 
the earnings penalty. This was in line with our expectations for Hong Kong Chinese in 
particular. For TMS Chinese, their pay advantage increased, indicating that it was achieved 
in other industries. This becomes clearer when we interact the Chinese groups with the 
industry dummy (Table 2, Model 5 and Figure 2).  
Figure 2 illustrates how the distribution, restaurant and hospitality industries were 
associated with significantly lower wages for the Chinese groups than for the white UK-
born also working in these industries.  The exception is TMS Chinese who are paid 
comparably to their white counterparts in these industries, even as they are less likely than 
other Chinese to participate in them. It is therefore not simply greater participation in a 
low-paying sector that contributes towards lower pay among many groups of Chinese, but 
the wages that Chinese people command in these specific industries. Conversely, for the 
TMS Chinese, their weaker relationship to the ethnic economy could be part of their source 
of advantage.  
We see from the main effects in model 5 that outside the enclave economy, 
Mainlanders, Hong Kong Chinese and Vietnamese experienced no pay penalty, while BBCs 
and (especially) TMS Chinese experienced a substantial pay advantage. Access to 
occupations outside traditional ones seem to offer, then, some potential for earnings 
assimilation. Within the niche economies, however, Mainlanders had predicted pay of 21 
per cent less per hour (0.07-0.28) than the white majority in these same, low-paying 
industries (amounting to 45 per cent less than white majority working in other industries); 
and the Hong Kong-born were estimated to be paid around 24 per cent (0.053-0.295) less 
per hour than their white majority industry counterparts. This illustrates how for these 
groups, both concentration in the industry and the pay within it drives overall earnings 
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penalties. Counter to expectations, the within-industry penalties were no worse for 
Mainlanders than for Hong Kong Chinese. Some of these industry differentials may be due 
to differences in English language proficiency, which has been argued to be one of the most 
important predictors of migrant outcomes, independent of qualifications gained in the 
home country (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; Esser 2006). This would be consistent with 
existing understanding of the different language capabilities of the different migration 
cohorts, as well as with the effect of more recent migration.  
 However, it fails to account for the disadvantage of the UK-born and educated. 
Strikingly, BBCs working in the ethnic economy industries also faced a pay penalty of 12 
per cent (0.095-0.216) relative to their white majority counterparts. Yet, as Table 1 
showed, nearly a third of these UK born Chinese continue to work in this sector, compared 
to only 17 per cent of the white majority population. Given that the current adult 
generation of UK-born Chinese are dominated by children of Hong Kong migrants, who 
established and were heavily concentrated in the ethnic enclave economies, these findings 
suggest that the historical circumstances that produced this clustering have more 
multigenerational persistence than is generally assumed (cf. the discussion in Pang and 
Lau 1998).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
  
   
 Unemployment 
Even if the ethnic economy does not guarantee good wages, it has been argued to 
offer a possible trade-off by protecting against unemployment. We therefore consider 
whether there are differential risks of unemployment across the groups. Table 3 shows 
that only the Mainlanders and BBCs (at the 10 per cent level) had significantly higher 
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predicted unemployment than the white majority (Model 1), though point estimates were 
positive for all groups. Interestingly, and counter to our expectations, the Sino-Vietnamese 
subgroup fared no worse in unemployment than the other Chinese groups; and the Hong 
Kong Chinese did not fare notably better. For Mainlanders the unemployment penalty was 
around 3 percentage points, consistent with international evidence that China’s new wave 
of middle-class tertiary educated migrants struggle to find their qualifications and 
experience accepted overseas in the short-to-medium term (Ho 2011; Man 2004). Recency 
of arrival (Model 2) mediated this effect, indicating that it was the Mainlanders’ relative 
lack of familiarity with the UK labour market and potentially less developed English 
language skills on arrival that was driving these risks. This is reinforced by supplementary 
analysis excluding those who arrived in the last five years (online supplementary 
materials, Table S2), which shows no unemployment penalty for Mainlanders. 
 BBCs, however, had probabilities of unemployment rates 2.6 percentage points 
higher than their white majority peers.  This meant the predicted probability of 
unemployment for BBCs was 7.8 per cent, 50 per cent higher than the 5.2 per cent 
predicted for the white majority. This unemployment penalty is surprising given our 
expectation that the BBCs would be doing the best. Like the Mainlanders, they may have 
higher expectations of suitable work than their less educated counterparts. But as a native-
born and educated population, their penalty compared to the white majority defies easy 
explanation, especially since they do not have the English language challenges that 
Mainlanders may face. Their high levels of participation in the industries associated with 
the ethnic economy deliver lower pay than they might otherwise achieve, but apparently 
without the compensation of greater employment security. 
 
Discussion 
Despite popular impressions of the Chinese in the UK being a small and close-knit 
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community, this study depicts a fragmented population with varied labour market 
outcomes.  Our analysis suggested that the most important explanation for wage penalties 
can be sought in the nature of each group’s relationship with the ‘distribution, restaurants 
and hospitality’ industry cluster most closely related to the original Hong Kong Chinese-
run ethnic economy. The fact that this appears to be a disadvantage perpetuated across 
generations supports theories of segmented assimilation, which suggests specific ethnic 
contexts will have a significant effect on labour market outcomes for both the first and 
second generations (Portes and Zhou 1993; Waters et al. 2010). Rather than acting as a 
resource or launchpad for social mobility (Zhou 1995), in the UK the ethnic economy 
seems linked to ongoing economic constraints.  
Our analysis offers only limited support for the argument that the Chinese ethnic 
economy functions as the site of a trade-off between low unemployment and low wage jobs 
(Luk 2009; Clark and Drinkwater 2002).  The Mainland Chinese face high unemployment 
when they first arrive, which seems to feed into high ‘enclave’ industry participation, a 
large ‘enclave’ industry wage penalty, and abiding status as employees not employers. 
Given that such a large proportion of the most newly arrived Chinese migrant group –
Mainlanders – have been absorbed into this low-wage enclave industry system, this raises 
the question of whether the pattern of multigenerational enclave wage penalties will be 
repeated for their children, as it appears to have been for a sizeable share of the children of 
the Hong Kong migration.  
The size and ongoing growth of the Mainland Chinese population underlines the 
importance of understanding their specific barriers to labour market participation, 
including the persistent role of discrimination and exclusion over time (Heath 2017). Their 
experiences may prove a better guide to future outcomes of the ‘UK Chinese’ than 
theoretical expectations based on the earlier survival strategies of the Hong Kong-born:  a 
very different community in a very different era, even though both groups share 
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concentration in and wage penalties within the ethnic economy.  
The previously unresearched TMS Chinese seem to have a very different 
relationship to the ethnic economy, and experience very different outcomes.  Their lack of 
any significant wage penalty within the enclave industries, and their overall wage premium 
suggests a lack of reliance on the low-wage economy. If any group matches the common 
stereotype of Chinese success, it would be appear to be this little-studied set of groups.  
Some research has suggested that avoiding Mainlanders, Cantonese people, and 
Chinatown enclaves is a successful economic strategy employed by highly educated 
Taiwanese migrants in the US (Waldinger et al. 1992). Meanwhile, the idea of Singaporeans 
and Malaysians having optimal cultural capital as a ‘bridge’ community between the ethnic 
and mainstream economies in the UK seems to be born out in their observed success. They 
may have had less need of a protective Chinese enclave, and, if they seek it out, they may be 
able to demand higher pay and positions as an educated, higher-skilled community 
without language limitations. Understanding more about the selection of these more 
successful migrants may shed light on how such trajectories are achieved.   
 
Conclusions 
By focusing on diversity within an ethnic group that has been understudied in quantitative 
migration research the UK, we have shed new light on existing discussions relating to 
contexts of reception, migrant selectivity and the role of enclave economies. Our study has 
challenged the simple linear perspective on Chinese immigrant success, and presented 
unexpected findings on the challenges faced by second generation Chinese in reaping the 
benefits of their educational achievements.  It indicates that, within the UK, the Chinese 
ethnic group is diverse and has diverse experiences of the labour market, with no unified 
Chinese reception community providing consistent social and economic integration for 
new migrants. Our findings suggest that some groups have become ‘trapped’ in the low-
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wage enclave due to historical path dependency and intergenerational persistence, and 
that these ethnic enclaves do not bring the benefits that have been associated with them in 
more optimistic interpretations (Portes and Jensen 1987; Zhou 1995).  Instead, 
overrepresentation within these low wage economies appears to account for ethnic 
penalties experienced by many of the Chinese sub-populations, but avoided by TMS 
Chinese. Our study provides further weight to existing research which has suggested a 
more cautious interpretation of enclave economies (Clark and Drinkwater 2002; Sanders 
and Nee 1987; Xie and Gough 2011).  
The traditional notion that Chinese are on a rapid path to upward mobility (Cheng 
1996) is challenged by the persistent overrepresentation of BBCs in the ‘enclave’ 
industries, where they work for lower wages than is typical for these jobs. This abiding 
multigenerational industry penalty associated with the ethnic economy, contrasts sharply 
with evidence of wage advantages for Taiwanese, Malaysians and Singaporeans, who have 
arrived free of a family history in the enclave, and tend to be highly selected in terms of 
language and skills. For the UK-born, we see evidence in their experiences of a legacy of 
exclusion and disadvantage, despite the positive stereotypes they also encounter (Chau 
and Yu 2001; Heath 2017; Francis and Archer 2005).  At the same time, free of the ethnic 
enclave they experience the wage, but not employment, advantages associated with the 
Chinese success story (Lee and Zhou 2015), indicating polarised labour market outcomes 
even within this subpopulation. 
Our study illustrates the potential for future research on numerically small 
minorities. Despite limitations, this study has revealed the potential for further research 
using a disaggregated approach, as well as presenting findings that demand further 
attention in more sophisticated analyses. This is not to say the approach is without its 
problems. We remain constrained by the need to combine conceptually important and 
distinct groups, such as the Sino-Vietnamese with others, and we can only employ rather 
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crude covariates, given that the data are not specifically designed to collect information on 
migrants and their qualifications. Our use of self-reported ethnic group means we are 
unable to consider those of Chinese ancestry who do not identify as Chinese.  While, as 
noted, Chinese identification is almost universal among those with two Chinese parents, 
limited sample sizes in existing sources means we have little understanding of the 
identification of those of mixed Chinese ancestry.  Further work with data sources that are 
able to capture parental ethnicity in sufficient numbers for analysis of Chinese people 
would be needed to ascertain how far this is an issue, and the likely direction of any 
ensuing bias. Similarly, being more categorically able to identify those Sino-Vietnamese 
who were part of the post-1975 refugee flow, might enhance our understanding of this 
group. While highlighting the relevance of migrant selectivity to our understanding of 
different subpopulations’ trajectories, we cannot fully take account of the potential impact 
of selective remigration. Future attempts to address the implications of selective migration 
would enhance our insights into more and less successful groups.  Nevertheless, we believe 
we have shown that there is significant scope for further exploring the relationship of 
different UK Chinese subgroups within the UK labour market.   
Our findings have also highlighted the importance of gathering information on 
language capabilities in large-scale social surveys. Even when language fluency is included 
in UK Censuses and surveys, measures categorise those who speak poor English, 
essentially capturing deficiencies. We have suggested instead, that multilingual capabilities 
may provide important cultural capital. 
Future research that attempts to account for the ‘unexplained’ advantage of 
Taiwanese, Malaysians and Singaporeans, alongside the disadvantage of UK-born Chinese, 
has the potential to provide better understanding of group boundaries and identity, and to 
contribute to work that avoids simplistic culturalist explanations of socio-economic 
outcomes, and which takes seriously different pathways to success and marginalisation 
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(Jimenéz et al. 2015). Our study also aligns with wider moves towards considering the 
articulation of selectivity from origin with reception at destination in migration studies 
(Luthra et al. 2017); and with the focus on how economic outcomes are distributed across 
populations rather than simply how they affect the average member.  It therefore has 
potential theoretical payoffs beyond the important reconsideration of Chinese economic 
wellbeing in the UK.  
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All look the same: Figures and Tables 
 
 White 
British UK-
born  
Total Chinese 
in subgroups 
Chinese sub-groups by country of birth 
Mainlander  Hong Kong TMS Chinese BBC  Sino-Vietnamese 
and others 
N 385,928 2,107 741 448 389 379 150 
Mean age & S.D 44.4 (12.78) 40.1  (11.41) 37.6 (10.35) 46.1 (10.86) 41.6 (11.42) 33.4 (8.80) 46.5 (10.95) 
% Aged 20-29 16.56 21.90 25.51 9.82 15.17 36.41 6.67 
% Aged 30-39 19.41 32.84 34.82 17.63 32.90 41.42 24.67 
%Aged 40+ 64.03 45.26 39.68 72.54 51.93 22.16 68.67 
% female 52.0 57.7 59.9     55.8     65.0 48.3 57.3 
% tertiary educated 32.28 54.5 54.2 38.3    64.4    70.2 38.1       
% arrived in last 10 years 0.011 
 
22.6 39.6       8.8    30.5      0.00 17.8 
Mean year of migration N/A 1994 2001 1985 1995 N/A 1989 
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Median year of migration  N/A 1999 2002 1984 1999 N/A 1988 
Analytical sample: ILO 
economically active, N 
288,560 1585 532 333 291 327 102 
% ILO-defined Unemployed 5.2 6.4 7.5 5.1 4.8 7.7 4.9 
Analytical sample: with wage 
information N  
183,243 864 281 165 180 183 55 
Median hourly wage in £ 11.52 12.63 11.54 10.95 16.18 13.16 8.75 
Mean hourly wage in £ (SD) 14.30 
(14.39) 
15.30 (10.47) 14.66 (9.96) 13.45 (9.01) 18.22 (11.95) 15.87 (10.75) 12.87 (9.07) 
N= distribution, food & 
hospitality  
47,573 608 215 173 79 101 40 
% of total economically 
active in distribution food & 
hospitality 
16.6 38.8 42.2 50.9      26.6 31.8      38.8 
N=with occupational class 379,628 2068 722 446 385 369 146 
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics, white majority and Chinese subgroups 
Source: Labour Force Survey, January-March 2008 to April-June 2017, adults aged 20-64 excluding full-time students, unweighted Ns, means and proportions. 
Analytical samples for economically active and wages exclude all those with missing values on covariates. 1Despite being UK-born a small number of this group ‘re-
entered’ the UK from having lived abroad and so provide information on year of arrival. 
  
data (NS-Sec) 
% of total with class data 
self-employed/ small 
business owners 
8.8 10.4 9.7 18.4 5.4 8.1 8.9 
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Table 2. Log wages. Estimates from OLS regression models (standard errors in 
parentheses), N=184,107 
 Model 1: 
Age and 
sex 
Model 2: 
+tertiary 
education 
Model 3: 
plus 
recency of 
arrival 
Model 4: 
+ethnic 
economy 
industry 
Model 5: + 
interaction 
Chinese 
subgroup & 
industry 
Chinese sub-group (Ref=white 
British UK-born) 
    
Mainland China 0.0182 -0.105** -0.063 -0.018 0.071 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.043) 
Hong Kong -0.086† -0.137*** -0.122** -0.064 0.053 
 (0.049) (0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.043) 
Taiwan, M’sia & SG 0.236*** 0.090* 0.122** 0.152*** 0.197*** 
 (0.046) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) 
Vietnam & others -0.136† -0.184** -0.159* -0.0848 0.012 
 (0.077) (0.067) (0.067) (0.062) (0.094) 
BBC 0.155*** -0.000 -0.000 0.034 0.095* 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.041) 
Recent migrant (<10 
years) 
  
-0.123** -0.112** -0.089* 
   (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) 
Hospitality, catering 
and distribution 
industry 
   
-0.235*** -0.233*** 
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    (0.00297) (0.00298) 
Industry*Mainlander     -0.280*** 
     (0.066) 
Industry*HK     -0.295*** 
     (0.078) 
Industry*TMS     -0.196* 
     (0.090) 
Industry*Viet & other     -0.215† 
     (0.117)) 
Industry*BBC     -0.216** 
     (0.079) 
Controls for age and 
sex 
YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls for tertiary 
education 
NO YES YES  YES YES 
Constant 2.345*** 2.170*** 2.170*** 2.240*** 2.240*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.249 0.272 0.272 0.248 
Source: Labour Force Survey, January-March 2008 to April-June 2017, adults aged 20-64 in paid 
work, excluding full-time students, income weights applied.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.1; * p<0.05; † p<.10 
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Table 3. Probability of unemployment. Average Marginal Effects from logistic regression 
models (standard errors in parentheses), N= 290,145 
 Model 1: Controlling for age, 
sex and education 
Model 2: plus 
recency of arrival 
Chinese sub-group (Ref=white 
British UK-born) 
  
Mainlander 0.030 (0.012)* 0.010 (0.012) 
Hong Kong 0.009 (0.013) 0.003 (0.013) 
Taiwan, M’sia, S’pore 0.016 (0.017) 0.002 (0.015) 
Vietnamese and others 0.008 (0.026) 0.000 (0.024) 
BBC 0.026 (0.15)† 0.026 (0.15)† 
Control for recent migrant (<10 
years) 
NO 
YES 
Controls for age sex and tertiary 
education 
YES YES 
Pseudo R2 from full model 0.042 0.042 
Source: Labour Force Survey, January-March 2008 to April-June 2017, economically active adults 
aged 20-64 excluding full-time students, sampling weights applied  
* p<0.05; † p<.10 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Estimated log hourly wages for white British & Chinese subgroups, 95% CIs 
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Source: Labour Force Survey, January-March 2008 to April-June 2017. Estimates from OLS, controlling 
for age, sex, tertiary education, and recent migration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated log hourly wages for White British and Chinese subgroups in the 
distribution, hotel & restaurant industries, 95% CIs 
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Source: Labour Force Survey, January-March 2008 to April-June 2017. Estimates from OLS including 
interaction between industry and subgroup, controlling for age, sex, tertiary education, and recent 
migration 
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All Look the Same? Diversity of labour market outcomes of Chinese ethnic group 
populations in the UK: Supplementary online materials 
 
Table S1. Log Hourly Wage, excluding those who migrated in last 5 years. Estimates from 
OLS regression models (standard errors in parentheses), N=184,003, 
 Model 1: 
Age and 
sex 
Model 2: 
+tertiary 
education 
Model 3: 
plus 
recency of 
arrival 
Model 4: 
+ethnic 
economy 
industry 
Model 5: + 
interaction 
Chinese 
subgroup & 
industry 
Chinese sub-group (Ref=white 
British UK-born) 
    
Mainlander 0.064 -0.056 -0.045 0.0002 0.094* 
 (0.044) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.046) 
Hong Kong -0.090† -0.134** -0.130** -0.071† 0.052 
 (0.052) (0.044) (0.045) (0.041) (0.046) 
TMS Chinese 0.269*** 0.119** 0.131** 0.158*** 0.210*** 
 (0.048) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) 
Sino-Viet and others -0.084 -0.127† -0.121 -0.053 0.047 
 (0.084) (0.073) (0.073) (0.068) (0.096) 
BBC 0.155*** -0.000 -0.000 0.034 0.095* 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.041) 
Recent migrant (5-10 
years) 
  
-0.064 -0.048 -0.021 
   (0.062) (0.058) (0.058) 
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Hospitality, catering 
and distribution 
industry 
  
 -0.235*** -0.233*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Industry*Mainlander     -0.295*** 
     (0.069) 
Industry*HK     -0.307*** 
     (0.083) 
Industry*TMS     -0.235* 
     (0.101) 
Industry*Viet&other     -0.234† 
     (0.127) 
Industry*BBC     -0.216** 
     (0.080) 
Controls for age & sex YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls for tertiary 
education 
NO YES YES  YES YES 
Constant 2.345*** 2.170*** 2.170*** 2.240*** 2.240*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.248 0.248 0.272 0.272 
Source: Labour Force Survey, January-March 2008 to April-June 2017, adults aged 20-64 in paid 
employment, excluding full-time students and those who arrived in the UK five or fewer years 
before being surveyed, income weights applied.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.1; * p<0.05; † p<.10 
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Table S2: Probability of Unemployment, excluding those who migrated in last 5 years. 
Average Marginal Effects from logistic regression models (standard errors in parentheses), 
N=289,940 
 Model 1: Controlling for age, 
sex and education 
Model 2: plus 
recency of arrival 
Chinese sub-group (Ref=white 
British UK-born) 
  
Mainlander 0.009 (0.013) 0.002 (0.013) 
Hong Kong 0.009 (0.014) 0.006 (0.014) 
Taiwan, M’sia, S’pore 0.007 (0.017) -0.001 (0.017) 
Vietnamese and others 0.016 (0.029) 0.013 (0.028) 
BBC 0.026 (0.015)† 0.026 (0.15)† 
Control for recent migrant (5-10 
years) 
NO 
YES 
Controls for age sex and tertiary 
education 
YES YES 
Pseudo R2 from full model 0.042 0.042 
Source: Labour Force Survey, January-March 2008 to April-June 2017, economically active adults 
aged 20-64 excluding full-time students and those who arrived in the UK five or fewer years before 
being surveyed, sampling weights applied  
* p<0.05; † p<.10 
 
 
 
 
 
